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The Cleveland Scholarship and Tutoring
Program:
Why Voucher Programs Do Not Violate the
Establishment Clause
MARGARET A. NERO*
The Cleveland Scholarship and Tutoring Program is a controversial school
voucher program which allows families to apply state finds to sectarian
schools. This Case Comment examines Simmons-Harris v. Goff, in which an
Ohio appellate court reversed a lower court decision and found the Program in
violation of the Establishment Clause. This Case Comment reviews the U.S.
Supreme Court precedents which have applied the traditional three-prong test
established in Lemon v. Kurtzman to cases involving public aid to sectarian
schools. This Case Comment concludes that the Program is constitutional
because it neutrally provides scholarships to families of sectarian,
nonsectarian, private, and public school children, without regard to the nature
of the school benefited. The Program provides low-income families with the
choice of equal educational opportunities already enjoyed by higher-income
families.
I. INTRODUCTION
An education revolution occurred in Cleveland, Ohio during the 1996-
1997 school year. For the first time, low-income families sent their children to
private sectarian schools paying for tuition with vouchers from the state
government.' This school voucher program survived its first legal challenge in
July of 1996,2 but the Court of Appeals of Ohio for the Tenth District in
Simmons-Harris v. Goff struck it down as unconstitutional on May 1, 1997.3
The program will be allowed to operate again for the 1997-1998 school year as
the Supreme Court of Ohio has stayed execution of the appellate court's
judgment pending the appeal to the state's highest court.4 While other states
* I want to thank my family for their constant love and support. Their faith has
enabled me tofly.
I See All Things Considered: Cleveland Parents Use Vouchers for the First hme
(National Public Radio broadcast, Aug. 28, 1996).
2 See Gatton v. Goff, No. 96CVH-01-193, 1996 WL 466499, at *20 (Franklin County
Ohio C.P. July 31, 1996), revd sub nom. Simmons-Harris v. Goff, No. 96APE08-982, 1997
WL 217583 (10th Dist. Ohio Ct. App. May 1, 1997).
3 See Simmons-Harris v. Goff, No. 96APE08-982, 1997 WL 217583, at *16 (10th Dist.
Ohio Ct. App. May 1, 1997).
4 See Simmons-Harris v. Goff, No. 96APE08-982, 1997 WL 217583 (10th Dist. Ohio
Ct. App. May 1, 1997), motion to stay granted, No. 97-1117 (Ohio July 24, 1997).
OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL
have debated the merits of publicly-funded voucher programs, 5 only Ohio and
Wisconsin have successfully operated programs, 6 and only Ohio's voucher
program allows sectarian schools to participate. 7
5 Voucher initiatives have been placed on the ballot, but been defeated, in several states,
including California, Oregon, Colorado, and Pennsylvania. See Peter W. Cookson, Jr., There
is No Escape Clause in the Social Contract: The Case Against School Vouchers, in CHOOSING
SCHOOLS: VOUCHERS AND AMERICAN EDUCATION 111, 118 (Rita Smith ed., 1996).
6 The Wisconsin program, Milwaukee Parental Choice Program, was enacted in 1989.
See Wis. STAT. ANN. § 119.23 (West Supp. 1996). The program was upheld by the
Wisconsin Supreme Court in Davis v. Grover, 480 N.W.2d 460, 477 (Wis. 1992).
Along with the two existing publicly-funded programs, there are at least 30 privately-
funded programs in 18 states. See Susan Lee & Christine Foster, Trustbusters, FORBES, June
2, 1997, at 146, 148.
7 See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3313.975 (Banks-Baldwin Supp. 1996). Attempts to
include sectarian schools have been defeated in the courts in Wisconsin, see Jackson v.
Benson, No. 95-CV-1982, at 50 (Dane County Wis. Cir. Ct. 1997) (mem.), and Puerto Rico,
see Asociacion de Maestros de Puerto Rico v. Torres, No. AC-94-371, 1994 WL 780744, at
*12 (P.R. Nov. 30, 1994). Interestingly, the initiative to expand the Milwaukee Parental
Choice Program to include sectarian schools came not from the state administrators, but from
the parents whose children did not receive the lottery-allocated vouchers. See McGROARTY,
BREAK THESE CHAINS 154 (1996). Some administrators feared that judicial battles over the
expansion to sectarian schools could lead to the defeat of the entire program. See id. See Parts
III and IV, infra, for a discussion of the constitutionality of applying vouchers to sectarian
schools. It was only after parents filed suit, see Miller v. Benson, 878 F. Supp. 1209 (E.D.
Wis. 1995), that the legislature amended the Milwaukee Parental Choice Program to allow
participation of sectarian schools, see Wis. STAT. ANN. § 119.23 (West Supp. 1996). To
date, however, the state courts have prevented the expansion by holding that the participation
of sectarian schools violates the Wisconsin Constitution. See Jackson, No. 95-CV-1982, at
50. Interestingly, the court conceded that the U.S. Supreme Court would not treat the voucher
plan as an unconstitutional direct aid to sectarian schools. See id. at 28. The Milwaukee
Parental Choice Program, at this time, continues to involve only nonsectarian private schools.
In Puerto Rico, the legislature in 1993 created the Special Scholarship and Free Selection
of Schools Program. See Jerome J. Hanus, An Argument in Favor of School Vouchers, in
CHOOSING SCHOOLS: VOUCHERS AND AMERICAN EDUCATION 1, 87-88 (Rita Smith ed.,
1996). The program provided vouchers to families earning $18,000 or less for children to
change schools from public to public, private to public, or public to private. See id. at 87.
Though the vast majority of the students participating used the vouchers to transfer from one
public school to another (1186 students, as compared with the 311 students who transferred
from public to private), the Puerto Rican Teachers Association filed suit against the program.
See id. at 88. The Puerto Rico Supreme Court struck down the provision providing vouchers
to students who transfer to private schools because of the Commonwealth Constitution
prohibition against the use of public funds for the "support of schools or educational
institutions other than those of the state." Asociacion de Maestros, 1994 WL 780744, at *7
(citing the P.R. CONST. art. II, § 5).
1104 [Vol. 58:1103
VOUCHER PROGRAMS
The creation of voucher programs is only one possible response to calls for
school reform. Some proposed reforms are rather modest, such as reducing
class size or creating mentoring or school-to-work programs. 8 Other more
creative reforms have included the creation of single-sex classrooms 9 and
language immersion programs.' 0 Calls for reform have arisen from the
perception, valid or not, that the public school system is failing a large portion
of its constituency." This Case Comment does not attempt to analyze the state
of American public education. It does not seek to enter into the argument over
the merits of public versus private education. At most, it advocates the right of
parents to have a meaningful choice among a variety of educational options for
their children. Educational choice should not be limited to families of above
average means who can afford the high cost of private education. Voucher
programs, and more specifically the Cleveland Scholarship and Tutoring
Program, seek to extend meaningful choice to low-income families.
This Case Comment argues for upholding the constitutionality of the
Cleveland Scholarship and Tutoring Program and similar voucher programs
that give financial aid to students attending sectarian schools. Opponents of the
Program charge that the Program violates the Establishment Clause of the U.S.
Constitution by providing government aid to sectarian schools.12 Part II of this
Case Comment examines the Cleveland Scholarship and Tutoring Program in-
depth, including why Cleveland was chosen as the pilot school district for the
Program. Part I provides an overview of the Establishment Clause and
8 See QuENnN L. QuADE, FINANCING EDUCATION: A STRUGGLE BETWEEN THE
GovERNmENTAL MONOPOLY AND PARENTAL CONTROL 27 (1996) (stating that these proposed
reforms treat only the symptoms of the educational problem in the United States).
9 See LynNell Hancock & Claudia Kalb, A Room of Their Own, NEwSWEEK, June 24,
1996 at 76, 76 (describing school districts' experiments with segregating the sexes in the
classroom).
10 See Robin M. Bennefield, Creative Solutions: Cette dcole estpublique, U.S. NEws &
WoRLD REP., Oct. 7, 1996 at 62, 62 (discussing a French immersion program in
Massachusetts).
11 See, e.g., JOHN E. CHUBB & TERRY M. MOE, PoUiTCs, MARKErs, AND AMmuCA'S
ScHooLs 1 (1990) (stating that common citizens, business leaders, public officials, and
educators share a common criticism that schools are failing in their core academic mission to
prepare children for the future); U.S. DEP'T oF EDUC., AMERICA 2000: AN EDUCATION
STRATEGY 1 (1991) (creating a national strategy to turn around public education); Thomas
Toch & Missy Daniel, Schools That Work, U.S. NEWs & WoRLD REP., Oct. 7, 1996 at 58
(contrasting two different blueprints for school reform).
12 See Simmons-Harris v. Goff, No. 96APE08-982, 1997 WL 217583, at *2 (10th Dist.
Ohio Ct. App. May 1, 1997). The opponents also claim that it violates several provisions of
the Ohio Constitution, including two religion clauses. See id. at *2-3. For a discussion of the
state law claims, see infra note 83.
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examines early cases involving aid to sectarian schools. It concludes with an
analysis of the landmark decision, Lemon v. Kurtzman.13
Part IV argues that the Cleveland Scholarship and Tutoring Program is
constitutional. First, the procedural history of Simmons-Harris v. Goff is
examined. Then, the post-Lemon cases are analyzed by distinguishing between
unconstitutional direct aid and constitutional indirect aid. The analysis concludes
that under the most recent Supreme Court precedents, the Cleveland
Scholarship and Tutoring Program is constitutional. The Case Comment
finishes in Part V with a look toward the future of voucher litigation.
II. EXAMINATION OF THE CLEVELAND SCHOLARSHIP AND TUTORING
PROGRAM
Ohio has adopted many different educational reform programs. 14 While
some programs have the support of the public school establishment, 15 voucher
proposals are stridently attacked by the public school establishment.
16
13 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
14 Many districts in Ohio have created magnet schools to complement the more
traditional ones. See Omo REv. CODE ANN. § 3313.901 (Banks-Baldwin 1995) (calling for
the development of magnet schools that focus on basic science, English language arts,
mathematics, and technology sIdils). Further, the Ohio General Assembly has promoted
interdistrict and intradistrict open enrollment. See Ohio REV. CODE ANN. § 3313.98 (Banks-
Baldwin Supp. 1996) (calling for all Ohio school districts to pass a resolution by July 1, 1993
to either entirely prohibit the enrollment of students from other districts or to adopt a policy
for such enrollment in accord with the mandates of the legislation).
15 See Oio DEP'T OF EDUC., REPORT ON OPEN ENROLLMENT 1 (1993) (stating that the
State Board of Education, the Ohio Education 2000 Commission, and the Gillmore
Commission all recommended to the Ohio General Assembly that open enrollment be
allowed).
16 See MYRON LIEBMUM, CATO INsTirTON PoUcY ANAI.YsIS No. 75, MAR r
SOLUTIONs TO THE EDUCATION CRisis 1 (1986) (asserting that the National Education
Association, the American Federation of Teachers, and their state and local affiliates have
played a large role in blocking meaningful education reform). Lieberman criticizes teachers,
saying that they are perhaps the most heavily unionized major occupation in the United States.
See id. He states that the unions exist only to maximize teacher benefits and not to represent
pupils or parents or the community. See id. The education establishment and other voucher
opponents argue that vouchers will hurt the public school system. One charge is that vouchers
will destroy neighborhood schools by encouraging parents to exit the system rather than work
to improve the public schools. See Cookson, supra note 5, at 161. Public school advocates
believe that public schools provide a valuable service to the nation by imparting a democratic
culture on a heterogeneous population of students. See MCGROARTY, supra note 7, at xx. A
second charge is that voucher programs take money away from the public school system.
See Hanus, supra note 7, at 59; Kimberly McLarin, Ohio Paying Some Tuition for Religious
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A. The Legislation
Ohio Governor George Voinivich led the call for comprehensive
elementary and secondary school reform in Ohio, including the use of
vouchers. He convened a special panel in 1992 to investigate school choice
programs and the effects of their possible implementation in Ohio.17 The
Cleveland Scholarship and Tutoring Program, enacted by the Ohio General
Assembly in 1995,18 borrowed heavily from the ideas in the panel's proposal.
Cleveland was chosen as the pilot district for reasons to be discussed below. 19
School Students, N.Y. TIMEs, Aug. 28, 1996, at B9. Any program which has the effect of
taking pupils and funds from the public school system could result in teacher and
administration cutbacks. Because the establishment maintains belief in these charges, it is
natural for teachers' unions to seek to maintain the status quo and protect their jobs.
Teachers' unions have enthusiastically joined in the judicial battles to prevent the
implementation of school choice and voucher proposals. The Ohio Federation of Teachers has
joined as a plaintiff in Simmons-Harris, 1997 WL 217583, at *2. Similarly, the Association of
Wisconsin School Administrators, Milwaukee Teachers Education Association, Wisconsin
Congress of Parents & Teachers, Inc., Milwaukee Administration & Supervisors Council,
Inc., and the Wisconsin Federation of Teachers all intervened in the Wisconsin case seeking
to prevent the implementation of the Milwaukee Parental Choice Program. See Davis v.
Grover, 480 N.W.2d 460, 465 (Wis. 1992).
17 See THE GOVERNOR'S COMMssON ON EDUCATIONAL CHOICE, THE OHMO
SCHoLARsHIP PLAN: A PLAN FOR THE PARENTAL RIGHT TO CHoosE SCHooLS 5 (1992). The
28 members of the panel included business leaders, teachers, the former head of the Ohio
PTA, school district superintendents, and school board members. See id. The panel was not
convened to discuss the merits or disadvantages of voucher programs, but only to develop a
plan to implement vouchers throughout Ohio. See id. The panel used the Akron School
District as a model to assess the strength of a voucher plan. See id. at 23. The panel's
proposal called for the creation of scholarships that students could apply to sectarian and
nonsectarian schools. See id. at 7. One of the major premises upon which the panel created
the voucher plans was that they be "substantially tilted in favor of low income parents and
students." Id. at 10, 16. This was accomplished in part by reserving 20% of the vouchers,
called scholarships in the Ohio plan, for low-income students. See id. at 11, 17. If the number
of low-income applicants exceeded the number of reserved scholarships, winners were to be
chosen by lot. See id. The participating private schools were not to be allowed to discriminate
on the basis of race or gender. See id. at 12, 18. Further, participating sectarian schools could
not use religious faith as a condition of acceptance. See id. Finally, though private schools
could charge additional tuition over the scholarship amount, the additional tuition charged to
low-income families could not exceed more than 10% of the amount of the scholarship. See
id. at 13, 19.18 See OHIo REV. CODE ANN. §§ 3313.974-3313.979 (Banks-Baldwin 1996).
19 The legislation calls for the pilot program to be in the city that "as of March 1995,
was under a federal court order requiring supervision and operational management of the
district by the state superintendent." Id. § 3313.975(A). In March 1995, Judge Krmpansky of
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The Program provides scholarships to students in grades kindergarten through
third; however, every recipient student will be able to retain the scholarship
through the eighth grade.20 The Cleveland Scholarship and Tutoring Program
offers scholarships of up to $250021 to students who attend participating private
schools in the Cleveland School District22 or participating public schools
outside of the District.23 It also offers a complementary tutorial assistance grant
to students who choose to remain in the Cleveland public school system. The
State Superintendent must provide tutorial assistance grants to the same number
of students who receive scholarships.
24
The Cleveland Scholarship and Tutoring Program is designed to benefit
children from low-income families.25 The amount of the scholarship is $2500
or the amount of tuition charged by the school the recipient attends, whichever
is lower.26 Once scholarship recipients from low-income families are accepted
at a participating private school, any additional tuition charged to the student
cannot exceed 10% of the amount of the scholarship.27 The scholarship or grant
amount is made payable to the parents of the qualifying students. 28 Students
the United States District Court, Northern District of Ohio, issued an order for the State
Superintendent to "assume immediate supervision and operational, fiscal and personnel
management of the [Cleveland Public School] District." Reed v. Rhodes, 1:73-CV-1300, at 6
(N.D. Ohio 1995) (order).
The creation of a pilot school district was a compromise of sorts. School voucher
supporters had wanted a state-wide program, while opponents fought against any program at
all. See State's Reply Brief in Support of its Motion for Summary Judgment at 1, Gatton v.
Goff, No. 96CVH-01-193, 1996 WL 466499 (Franklin County Ohio C.P. July 31, 1996).
20 See OHno REv. CODEANN. § 3313.975(C)(1).
21 See id. § 3313.978(C)(1).
22 See id. § 3313.978(A)(2).
23 See id. § 3313.978(A)(1).
24 See id. § 3313.978(B).
25 See Gatton v. Goff, No. 96CVH-01-193, 1996 WL 466499, at *14 (Franklin County
Ohio C.P. July 31, 1996) (stating that parents who wish their child to participate in the
Program must apply to the Superintendent to see if they fit the criteria for selection, with
preference being given to low-income students), rev'd sub nom. Simmons-Harris v. Goff, No.
96APE08-982, 1997 WL 217583 (10th Dist. Ohio Ct. App. May 1, 1997).26 See OI-o Rnv. CODE ANN. § 3313.978(C)(1).
27 See id. § 3313.976(A)(8).
28 See id. § 3313.979. The Cleveland Scholarship and Tutoring Program legislation
authorizes scholarships to be used both at private schools in Cleveland, see id.
§ 3313.978(A)(2), and public schools in neighboring school districts, see id.
§ 3313.978(A)(1). The payment of the scholarship amount is payable directly to the schools if
the scholarship is being applied to a public school in another district. See id. § 3313.979.
However, no public district around Cleveland applied for participation in the program for its
pilot year, so the distinction is largely moot. See CLEvELAND ScHOLARsmp AND TuTORiNG
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whose family incomes are below 200% of the poverty line receive 90% of the
scholarship; students whose family income meets or exceeds 200% of the
poverty line receive 75% of the scholarship. 29
B. Why Cleveland?
The Cleveland Public School District, the largest in the state, was a
particularly appropriate choice for the pilot district of the Scholarship and
Tutoring Program. 30 The turmoil of the District was well chronicled in the
media31 when a federal district court ordered the state to take over direct
supervision and control of the District.32 The district court found that the
Cleveland School District had, by late February 1995, already virtually
exhausted its operating budget for the fiscal year ending in June 1995 and was
expecting a $29.5 million shortfall. 33 The fiscal crisis was so severe that it
"totally [inhibited the District's] ability to provide even basic education." 34
Other chronicled signs of the crisis included a long-standing busing
PRoGRAM ENRouMENT REPORT (Oct. 24, 1996).
The Gatton trial court noted that the check is mailed directly to the school. Parents must
endorse the dheck at the school and sign a release. The court found, however, the school does
not authorize control of the money until the transfer. This method of payment assures only
that the money is used for its intended purpose. See Gatton, 1996 WL 466499, at *14.
29 See Omo REv. CODE ANN. § 3313.978(A). Students do not receive the full amount of
the scholarship from state funds. See id. § 3313.978(C)(4). The scholarships and tutorial
assistance grants are not to be disbursed until the State Superintendent determines that the
remainder of the scholarship or grant will be furnished by another political entity, private
entity, or person. See id.
30 The School District's student population for funding purposes was 75,424 students in
1995. See Jai PE'ro, AuDrroR OF STATE, STATE OF Omo, CiEvELAND Crry SCHOOL
DisTucr PERFORMANCE AuDrr at 1-4 (1996). Of those 75,424 students, 78.8% are
nonwhite, 72.5% are economically and academically disadvantaged, and 15.7% are
diagnosed with a disability. See id.
The choice of a district with a substantial population of economically disadvantaged
families is important to the constitutional analysis in Part IV, infra. Under traditional
Establishment Clause analysis, a state program must have a secular legislative purpose to be
consistitutional. See infra notes 58-64 and accompanying text. The secular purpose of the
Cleveland Scholarship and Tutoring Program is to provide quality educational choice to all
families, regardless of their financial status. See infra notes 87-89 and accompanying text.
31 See, e.g., Mark Skertic, Ohio's Largest School District in Chaos, C. ENQUIRER,
Mar. 19, 1995, at Al.
32 See Reed v. Rhodes, 1:73-CV-1300, at 6 (N.D. Ohio 1995).
33 See id. at 2-3.
3 4 JM PErRo, AuDrrOR OF STATE, STATE OF OHIO, CLEVELAND CrIY SCHOOL Disrmcr
PERFORMANCEAUDrr at 1-1 (1996).
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controversy, the failure of the District to eliminate segregated schools, buildings
in need of major repair, and proficiency test scores in the bottom ten percent of
school districts across the nation.35 The lack of public confidence in the School
District, prior to the choice of Cleveland for the pilot program, was evidenced
by the city's passage of only one school operating levy in the previous twenty-
five years.36 Further, as the Gatton trial court noted, many parents who had the
financial means to do so had chosen to take their children out of the Cleveland
public school system. 37
C. Implementation in the Pilot Year
The Cleveland School District faced these serious problems when it was
chosen by the Ohio General Assembly to become the pilot district for the
Scholarship and Tutoring Program. While it is too early to measure the success
of the Program,38 the Program has struck a responsive chord in many parents
and children. Over 6000 applications were received for scholarships for the
1996-1997 school year.39 Scholarship recipients had to be determined by
lottery. 4° Pilot year statistics demonstrate that the Cleveland Scholarship and
Tutoring Program has benefited children from low-income families. Of the
2684 applicant families with verified incomes, 2015 live at 100% of the poverty
level, and 670 live with incomes between 100%-200% of the poverty level.41
35 See Skertic, supra note 31, at Al.
36 See Scott Stephens, Survey: 60% Favor a City School Levy, CLEv. PLIN DEALER,
Sept. 12, 1996, at 4B. Interestingly, in November 1996 the city did pass a $13.5-mill levy
that will generate $67,000,000 in the first year. See Just Over Half of Local School Issues
Pass in Ohio, CAPrrAL MARKES REPORT, Nov. 6, 1996, available in WESTLAW, Ohio
News Database.
37 See Gatton v. Goff, No. 96CVH-01-193, 1996 WL 466499, at *1 (Franklin County
Ohio C.P. July 31, 1996), rev'd sub nom. Simmons-Harris v. Goff, No. 96APE08-982, 1997
WL 217583 (10th Dist. Ohio Ct. App. May 1, 1997).
38 Before success can be measured, educators, parents, and students must come to a
consensus on what constitutes the measure of success. Is it improved student test scores? Is it
the creation of more schools, thus creating greater choice for parents and children? Is it
improvement in the existing public school system as spurred on by the private school
competition? This Case Comment would argue that success is merely the providing of
meaningful educational choice for all parents, regardless of financial status.
39 Of the 6000 applications, the mandatory verified income information was received for
approximately one-half of the families. See CLEvELAND ScHoLAnsmp AND TuTORING
PROGRAM ENROLLMENT REPORT (Oct. 24, 1996).
40 See McLarin, supra note 16, at B9.
41 See CLEVELAND ScHoLARSI-p AND TuToRiNG PROGRAM ENROLLMENT REPORT
(Oct. 24, 1996). One news story stated that the mean income of people receiving scholarships
was approximately $6600 plus food stamps. See All Things Considered: Cleveland Parents
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The scholarship recipients applied their scholarships at the fifty-three private
schools across Cleveland who participated in the Program.42 Though a majority
of the student recipients were new enrollees to the private school to which they
applied the scholarship, approximately 21% had previously attended the school
to which they applied the scholarship. 43
The Cleveland Scholarship and Tutoring Program is not unique in its use of
vouchers. 44 What makes the Cleveland Scholarship and Tutoring Program
unique is the participation of sectarian schools, including those of the Christian,
Islamic, and Jewish faiths. The inclusion of sectarian schools not only makes
the Cleveland Scholarship and Tutoring Program unique, it also has generated
great controversy.45 Program opponents charge that vouchers take desperately
needed money away from the public schools46 and that giving public funds to
sectarian schools violates the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment.47
The plaintiffs in Simmons-Harris v. Goff charged that the Cleveland Scholarship
and Tutoring Program violates the Establishment Clause by providing state
scholarship money to fund religious activities at schools that teach religious
Use Vouchers for the First Time (National Public Radio broadcast, Aug. 28, 1996).
According to the 1994 Federal Poverty Guidelines, for a family of two, 100% of the
poverty level is $9661 and 200% of the poverty level is $19,322. For a family of four, 100%
of the poverty level is $15,141 and 200% of the poverty level is $30,282. See BUREAu OF THE
CENSUS, U.S. DEPT OF COMMERCE, STATSTCAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES 473
(Il6th ed. 1996).
42 See CLEVEAND SCHOLARSHIP AND TUTORING PROGRAM ENROLMENT REPORT
(Oct. 24, 1996).
43 See id.
44 See supra note 6 and accompanying text.
45 The most concrete example of the controversy is the litigation which is the focus of
this Case Comment. The debate over vouchers in general, and Ohio in particular, has spread
beyond the courtroom in Ohio and has been the focus of a great deal of attention from the
national media. See McLarin, supra note 16, at B9 (providing background to the Cleveland
Scholarship and Tutoring Program and covering the first day of classes); All Things
Considered: Clevelnd Parents Use Vouchers for the First Time (National Public Radio
broadcast, Aug. 28, 1996) (featuring brief comments from proponents and opponents of the
Cleveland Scholarship and Tutoring Program on the first day of classes); Today: Interview
with Jeanne Allen (NBC television broadcast, Sept. 24, 1996) (featuring an interview with
Jeanne Allen, the President of the Center for Education Reform, on the use of public money
for parochial schools).
46 The Ohio Federation of Teachers charges that the Program will drain the best students
from Cleveland's public schools without providing a way to improve the public school
system. "'It allows them to escape the problem, but it doesn't solve the problem for 70,000
other kids.'" McLarin, supra note 16, at B9 (quoting Ron Merec, the President of the Ohio
Federation of Teachers).
47 See id.
1997)
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doctrine as part of their curriculum.48 The discussion in the next two Parts of
this Case Comment will examine why this constitutional argument does not
have merit.
1H. AN OVERVIEW OF THE RELIGION CLAUSES AND AID TO SECTARIAN
SCHOOLS
A. Setting the Boundaries of the Establishment Clause: Pre-Lemon
Cases
The First Amendment to the Constitution states that "Congress shall make
no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise
thereof."49 These few words have generated fierce debate and litigation in the
area of governmental programs of financial assistance to sectarian schools. 50
The Supreme Court stated in the landmark 1971 decision, Lemon v. Kurtzman,
that the Court could "only dimly perceive the lines of demarcation in this
extraordinarily sensitive area of constitutional law." 51
The Supreme Court established some early boundaries of what is
acceptable under the First Amendment in cases leading up to Lemon. In
Everson v. Board of Education, where the Court held that a school district
could pay for the busing of children to parochial schools,5 2 the Court defined
the scope of the Establishment Clause:
Neither a state nor the Federal Government can set up a church. Neither can
pass laws which aid one religion, aid all religions, or prefer one religion over
another .... No tax in any amount, large or small, can be levied to support
any religious activities or institutions, whatever they may be called, or
whatever form they may adopt to teach or practice religion.53
4 8 See Gatton v. Goff, No. 96CVH-01-193, 1996 WL 466499, at *4 (Franklin County
Ohio C.P. July 31, 1996), rev'd sub nom. Simmons-Harris v. Goff, No. 96APE08-982, 1997
WL 217583 (10th Dist. Ohio Ct. App. May 1, 1997).
49 U.S. CONST. amend. I. Note that the First Amendment does not create a "wall of
separation between church and State." Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 164 (1878).
This theory of the First Amendment was espoused by Thomas Jefferson in a reply to an
address to him by the committee of the Danbury Baptist Association. See id.
50 See Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S. 388, 393 (1983) (stating that it is not easy to apply the
Court's decisions interpreting the Establishment Clause to cases involving the funding of
sectarian schools and parents of children who attend those schools).
51 Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612 (1971).
52 See Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 18 (1947).
53 Id. at 15-16. The Court also proscribed the following:
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Turning to the statute at issue, the Court found the transportation of
children to school to be general welfare legislation similar to providing police
and fire protection.54 The Court held that the Establishment Clause did not
prevent the state from extending the benefits of state laws to all citizens
regardless of their religious affiliation.55
The Supreme Court upheld a number of programs that benefited sectarian
schools during the next twenty-three years. 56 Much of the Court's analysis in
these cases will be important to the argument in Part IV that the Cleveland
Scholarship and Tutoring Program is constitutional. One theme of these early
cases was that the Establishment Clause is based on a theory of neutrality. The
Court stated that the purpose of the First Amendment was to require every state
"to be a neutral in its relations with groups of religious believers and non-
believers; it does not require the state to be their adversary." 57 To avoid a
violation of the Establishment Clause, a law must have a "secular legislative
purpose and a primary effect that neither advances nor inhibits religion." 58 For
example, in upholding a program in which the public school districts lent books
to students attending sectarian schools, the Court found that the secular purpose
was to further educational opportunities for the young and that the primary
beneficiaries of the program were parents and students, not the schools. 59 The
Neither [a state nor the Federal Government] can force nor influence a person to go
to or to remain away from church against his will or force him to profess a belief or
disbelief in any religion. No person can be punished for entertaining or professing
religious beliefs or disbeliefs, for church attendance or non-attendance .... Neither
a state nor the Federal Government can, openly or secretly, participate in the affairs
of any religious organizations or groups and vice versa.
Id.
54 See id. at 17-18.
55 See id. This rationale has been called the "child benefit or public purpose theory" of
the Establishment Clause. Hanus, supra note 7, at 44. Hanus asserts that to be constitutional,
the "aid must be designated by the child (that is, the parent or guardian) and not the school as
an institution." Id.
56 See Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 680 (1970) (granting property tax
exemptions for religious organizations using property solely for religious worship); Board of
Edue. v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236, 238 (1968) (allowing New York local school authorities to
lend textbooks free of charge to all students in grades seven through twelve, including those in
private schools); Zorach v. Clason, 343 U.S. 306, 315 (1952) (upholding New York's
program allowing students in public schools to be released during the day so they could
receive religious instruction off of school property).
57 Everson, 330 U.S. at 18.
58 Allen, 392 U.S. at 243 (citing School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 205 (1963))
(holding that public schools could not mandate that Bible passages be read at the beginning of
every school day).
59 See Allen, 392 U.S. at 243-44.
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one clear admonishment of the Court was that a state may not "finance
religious groups nor undertake religious instruction." 60
B. The Lemon Test
In Lemon v. Kurtnan,61 the Supreme Court sought to give concrete
structure to these vague neutrality guidelines. Statutes from Pennsylvania and
Rhode Island were challenged as violative of the Establishment Clause. The
Pennsylvania statute authorized the state to directly reimburse private
elementary and secondary schools the cost of teachers' salaries, textbooks, and
instructional materials for specified secular subjects. 62 The Rhode Island statute
authorized the state to directly pay teachers of secular subjects in private
schools a fifteen percent supplement to their annual salary. 63
The Court used the opportunity to establish a three-prong test, drawn from
the previous Establishment Clause cases, for determining the constitutionality of
government action. The first prong requires a statute to have a secular
legislative purpose. 64 The Lemon Court found that the legislative intent in
Pennsylvania and Rhode Island was to enhance the quality of secular education
in all schools, not to advance religion. The Court ruled that where nothing
undermines the stated legislative intent, the legislature must be accorded
appropriate deference. 65 The second prong requires that the principal or
primary effect of a statute must neither advance nor inhibit religion.66 The
Court again deferred to the judgments of the state legislatures in finding that the
secular and religious education components were identifiable and separable.
Therefore, paying expenses of secular books and salaries for teachers of secular
subjects did not have the primary effect of advancing or inhibiting religion.67
The third prong of the test states that the statute must not foster excessive
government entanglement with religion.68 It was based on this prong of the test
that the Court held that the Pennsylvania and Rhode Island statutes were
unconstitutional. 69 The Court found that there would be excessive entanglement
between the state and the religious schools because the state would have to
inspect and evaluate the schools' programs to ensure that the money received
60 Zorach, 343 U.S. at 309.
61 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
62 Seeid. at 606-07.
63 See id. at 607.
64 See id. at 612.
65 See id. at 613.
66 See id. at 612 (citing Board of Educ. v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236, 243 (1968)).
67 See id. at 613.
68 See id. (citing Walz v. Tax Conm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 674 (1970)).
69 See id. at 607.
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was being used only for secular purposes.70
The Lemon Court aimed to produce a clear roadmap for judicial
decisionmaking in the area of the Religion Clauses.71 Unfortunately, the Court
failed. 72 It seems easy to malign a body of judicial decisions filled with so many
apparent inconsistencies. The Court disallowed a tax credit for tuition expenses
incurred in sending children to private schools in a 1973 decision, Committee
for Public Education and Religious Liberty v. Aquist,73 but ten years later
upheld a tax deduction for a very similar purpose in Mueller v. Allen.74 In Meek
v. Pittenger, the Supreme Court upheld the loaning of textbooks to children
attending private schools, based on the Allen precedent, 75 but struck down the
loaning of educational materials directly to schools. 76 Finally, the Court
allowed busing of children to sectarian schools in Everson v. Board of
Education,77 but in Wolman v. Walter would not allow those same sectarian
school children to be bused for educational field trips with state money.
78
Of course, these apparently contradictory decisions can be at least partially
70 See id. at 620-21.
71 C. Committee for Pub. Educ. and Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 761
(1973). Justice Powell states that the constitutional standards for the Religion Clauses "have
become firmly rooted and the broad contours of our inquiry are now well defined." Id.
72 See Jesse H. Choper, The Establishment Clause and Aid to Parochial Schools-An
Update, 75 CAL. L. REv. 5, 6 (1987). Choper calls the subsequent decisions "a conceptual
disaster area." Id. Other commentators have voiced similar disdainful remarks. See also
Hanus, supra note 7, at 41 (stating that the kindest thing that can be said about the law in this
area is that it is a mess); Michael J. Stick, Educational Vouchers: A Constitutional Analysis,
28 COLUM. J.L. & Soc. PRos. 423, 423 (1995) (calling Supreme Court decisions after
Lemon inconsistent).
73 413 U.S. 756, 769 (1973).
74 463 U.S. 388, 391 (1983). In fairness to the Court, valid distinctions are made
between the two versions of tax relief. First, in Nyquist the tax relief was given only to
parents of private school children, while in Mueller the deduction was available to all parents
for tuition, transportation, and textbook expenses incurred at any school. See id. at 398.
Further, the tax deduction for education expenses is only one of many similar deductions
offered to Minnesota taxpayers. See id. at 396.
75 See Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349, 361-62 (1975).
76 See id. at 362-63. As will be discussed further in Part IV, infra, this distinction
between the indirect benefit of books to schools through the loan to schools and the direct loan
of educational materials to schools supports the argument for the constitutionality of the
Cleveland Scholarship and Tutoring Program. In the Cleveland Scholarship and Tutoring
Program the voucher is payable directly to the parents. It is only through the personal choice
of parents for their children to attend a private school that the school receives any benefit. See
infra Part V.C.
77 330 U.S. 1 (1947).
78 See Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229, 254 (1977).
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reconciled in every instance. The answer lies in such distinctions as direct aid
versus indirect aid. Further, some programs benefit only private schools while
others give benefits neutrally, regardless of the nature of the school. Part IV is
dedicated to explaining, through the lens of the Cleveland Scholarship and
Tutoring Program decisions, where the Supreme Court is headed on the
Establishment Clause and why providing vouchers to sectarian school children
is constitutional.
IV. CLEvELAND SCHOLARSHP AND TUTORING PROGRAM Is
CONSTITUTIONAL
A. Procedural History of Simmons-Harris v. Goff
Simmons-Harris v. Goff is the consolidated appeal of two cases filed in the
Franklin County, Ohio Common Pleas Court.79 The "Gatton" plaintiffs
included eight individuals, suing in their capacity as taxpayers, and the Ohio
Federation of Teachers. The "Simmons-Harris" plaintiffs included three
individuals suing in their capacity as taxpayers. 80 The plaintiffs sought a
declaratory judgment that the Cleveland Scholarship and Tutoring Program is
unconstitutional and an injunction preventing the implementation of the
Program during the 1996-1997 school year.81 The defendants were John M.
Goff, being sued in his capacity as Superintendent of Schools for the State of
Ohio, and the State of Ohio. Intervening defendants included a number of
existing private schools who sought to participate in the Program, two
organizations that opened private schools in order to participate in the Program,
two parents who wished for their children to participate in the Program, and
one parent whose child had been selected to receive a scholarship.82
Though the plaintiffs brought claims on several grounds, not all of which
were granted relief,83 this Case Comment only focuses on the claim that the
79 See Simmons-Harris v. Goff, No. 96APE08-982, 1997 WL 217583, at *2 (10th Dist.
Ohio Ct. App. May 1, 1997).80 See id. That the teachers' union would join as a plaintiff in opposing the Cleveland
Scholarship and Tutoring Program is consistent with actions of teachers' unions across the
country in leading the fight against all school voucher initiatives. See supra note 16 and
accompanying text.
81 See Simmons-Harris, 1997 WL 217583, at 2.
82 See id.
83 First, the plaintiffs claimed that the program violates two religious provisions of the
Ohio Constitution: "All men have a natural and indefeasible right to worship Almighty God
according to the dictates of their own conscience. No person shall be compelled to attend,
erect, or support any place of worship, or maintain any form of worship, against his
consent." Omo CONST. art. I, § 7. "[N]o religious or other sect, or sects, shall ever have any
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exclusive right to, or control of, any part of the school funds of this state." OmHo CONST. art.
VI, § 2. Ohio courts have not found that either of these provisions gives broader constitutional
protection than the First Amendment of the U.S. Constitution. See South Ridge Baptist
Church v. Industrial Comm'n, 676 F. Supp. 799, 808 (S.D. Ohio 1987) (stating that Ohio
courts have not indicated that they would interpret Article I of the Ohio Constitution more
strictly than the Supreme Court has interpreted the First Amendment); Honohan v. Holt, 244
N.E.2d 537, 544 (Franklin County Ohio C.P. 1968) (rejecting the argument that the Ohio
Constitution provisions are more restrictive than the First Amendment). The Simmons-Harris
appellate court ruled that the Ohio Constitution's protection from state funding of sectarian
institutions is essentially coextensive with that of the Establishment Clause of the First
Amendment. See Simmons-Harris, 1997 WL 217583, at *11. Therefore, the Cleveland
Scholarship and Tutoring Program was found to violate the religions provisions of the Ohio
Constitution for the same reasons it violated the United States Constitution. See id. at *11-12.
Second, the plaintiffs claimed that the Cleveland Scholarship and Tutoring Program
violates the constitutional provision that "[a]ll laws, of a general nature, shall have a uniform
operation throughout the State." Orno CONSr. art. II, § 26. The Gatton trial court rejected
this argument on the grounds that the provision means only that the law must be uniform upon
those who fit the law's operative scheme. See Gatton v. Goff, No. 96CVH-01-193, 1996 WL
466499, at *16 (Franklin County Ohio C.P. July 31, 1996) (citing State ex rel. Stanton v.
Powell, 142 N.E. 401, 401 (Ohio 1924)), rev'd sub nom. Simmons-Harris v. Goff, No.
96APE08-982, 1997 WL 217583 (10th Dist. Ohio Ct. App. May 1, 1997). The classifications
of the operative scheme must be reasonable, and the General Assembly's choice to establish a
pilot program was reasonable. See id. at *17. The appellate court disagreed with this
interpretation. See Simnons-Harris, 1997 WL 217583, at *14. It warned against conceptually
blurring the Unifornity Clause with the Equal Protection and Benefit Clauses. See id. The
appellate court held that the Scholarship Program violated the Uniformity Clause because it
operated only in Cleveland and not in similarly situated school districts throughout Ohio. See
id.
Third, the "Simmons-Harris" plaintiff alone claimed that the Cleveland Scholarship and
Tutoring Program violated the constitutional provision that "[tlhe general assembly... will
secure a thorough and efficient system of common schools throughout the State." OHio
CONST. art. VI, § 2. The appellate court rejected this claim on the grounds that the mandate
to fund a common school system did not restrict state educational funding to that purpose
alone. See Simmons-Harris, 1997 WL 217583, at *12-13. Even if the state was establishing a
state-funded private school system, that would not violate the Thorough and Efficient
provision. See id. at *13.
Finally, the "Simmons-Harris" plaintiffs alone claimed that the Cleveland Scholarship
and Tutoring Program violated the constitutional provision stating that "[n]o bill shall contain
more than one subject, which shall be clearly expressed in its tile." OIno CONSr. art. II,
§ 15(D). The appellate court also rejected this argument. See Simmons-Harris, 1997 WL
217583, at *15. It stated that the purpose of the provision was to prevent "riders" from being
attached to unrelated bills. The Cleveland Scholarship and Tutoring Program was created in
an appropriations bill. See id. The court held that "it is well-settled that a bill may establish a
program and make an appropriation for that program without violating the one-subject rule."
Id. (citing Dix v. Celeste, 464 N.E.2d 153, 159 (Ohio 1984)).
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Cleveland Scholarship and Tutoring Program violates the Establishment Clause
of the United States Constitution. There have been many significant
Establishment Clause decisions in the area of aid to sectarian schools since
Lemon v. Kurtzman,84 and each will be examined in turn below.
B. Constitutional Analysis of Establishment Clause Cases Involving Aid
to Sectarian Schools
1. Lemon Test: First and Third Prongs
The appellate court began with the traditional focus on the Lemon three-
prong test.85 Only the "Simmons-Harris" plaintiffs challenged the Scholarship
Program on the third prong, excessive entanglement. The Simmons-Harris
appellate court dismissed this challenge in a footnote stating that "nothing in the
scholarship program, or the Pilot Program as a whole, calls for the sort of
'comprehensive, discriminating and continuing state surveillance,' necessary to
foster an excessive government entanglement with religion." 86 Similarly, the
court did not examine the secular purpose prong because the parties had not put
84 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
85 See supra notes 64-70 and accompanying text (discussing the Lemon three-prong
test). The Court has stated that Lemon is to be particularly relied upon in the "sensitive
relationship between government and religion in the education of our children... [because
tihe government's activities can have a magnified impact on impressionable young minds."
School Dist. v. Ball, 473 U.S. 373, 383 (1985).
86 Simmons-Harris, 1997 WL 217583, at *10 n.4 (citing Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S.
388, 403 (1983)). This prong has long been the subject of strong criticism from the Court.
Justice Rehnquist has called it an "'insoluble paradox' in school aid cases: we have required
aid to parochial schools to be closely watched lest it be put to sectarian use, yet this close
supervision itself will create an entanglement." Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 109 (1985)
(Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting) (citing Roemer v. Maryland Bd. of Pub. Works, 426 U.S. 736,
768-69 (1976) (White, J., concurring)); see also Bowen v. Kendrick, 487 U.S. 589, 615
(1988) (referring to the entanglement prong as a "Catch-22" situation); Aguilar v. Felton, 473
U.S. 402, 430 (1985) (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (citation omitted) (stating that the Court's
anomalous results in this area are due in large part to the entanglement prong).
Rehnquist calls for restricting the political divisiveness inquiries to situations where
direct financial subsidies are paid to parochial schools or to teachers in parochial schools. See
Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S. 388, 403 n.11 (1983). O'Connor would fold it into the effects
prong of the Lemon test. See LAuRENcE H. ThBE, AMERICAN CONsTrrmONAL LAW, § 14-
11, at 1228 (2d ed. 1988). But see School Dist. v. Ball, 473 U.S. 373, 383 (1985) (stating that
the Lemon test is appropriate in governing the relationship between government and religion
in the education of children because of the strong opportunity for divisive rifts along religious
lines in the political process).
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it at issue.87 However, the court did state that the purpose of the Cleveland
Scholarship and Tutoring Program was to provide low-income parents the
opportunity to educate their children outside of the embattled Cleveland Public
School System, and not to advance religion.8 8 To say that the secular purpose is
to provide all families with the opportunity for quality educational choice is
consistent with the aims of the Program's proponents89 and with the purposes
upheld in other school aid cases.90
2. Lemon Test: Second Prong
Having dispensed of the first and third prong of the Lemon test, the
Simmons-Harris appellate court tuned its attention to the second prong, the
effects test.91 The appellate court examined Supreme Court precedents and
stated that the highest court focuses on two factors to determine whether a
87 See Simmons-Harris, 1997 WL 217583, at *4.
88 See id.
89 The Program's sponsors emphasize the educational benefits to the children, more than
the financial benefit to parents. Speaking about the Program, Ohio Governor George
Voinivich has stated that "it will provide children from poor- and middle-income families
with increased educational opportunities which they might not have otherwise enjoyed." Suit
Filed to Block Vouchers, UPI, Jan. 11, 1996, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, UPI File.
William Mellor, the President of the Institute for Justice, has stated that "[t]he sole purpose of
Ohio's voucher program is to help get poor kids a quality education, period." Carol Innerst,
Rights Groups, Teachers Join Suit to Block Vouchers, WASH. TIMEs, Feb. 1, 1996, at A6.
Polly Williams, a community activist and voucher proponent in Milwaukee has been quoted
as giving this memorable description: "Bill Clinton and Hillary Clinton should not be the only
people in America who live in public housing who get to send their kid to private school."
Clint Bolick of the Institute for Justice, School Voucher Debate at the Ohio State University
College of Law (Nov. 21, 1996).
90 See, e.g., Witters v. Washington Dep't of Servs. for the Blind, 474 U.S. 481, 485-86
(1986) (stating that the secular purpose in allowing Witters to take advantage of vocational
rehabilitation services while he attended a Bible college was to promote the well-being of the
visually handicapped); Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349, 363 (1975) (stating that the secular
purpose of allowing direct loans of educational materials to private schools would be to ensure
ample opportunity for schoolchildren to develop their intellectual capacities); Lemon v.
Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 613 (1971) (stating that the secular purpose of statutes that provide
fumds to pay the salaries of teachers of secular subjects in private schools is to enhance the
quality of secular education in all of the state's schools).
91 See Simmons-Harris, 1997 WL 217583, at *4. One commentator examining the post-
Lemon cases has broken down the effects prong into three factors. First, are the benefits
neutrally provided? Second, are the benefits conferred upon religious institutions incidental
and attenuated? Third, what is the form of the aid? See Peter J. Weishaar, Comment, School
Choice Vouchers and the Establishment Clause, 58 Ar2. L. Riv. 543, 561 (1994).
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program has the primary effect of promoting religion. First, is the program
neutral towards religion? Second, is the profferred aid direct and substantial or
indirect and incidental? 92
a. Unconstitutional Direct Aid to Schools
In its earlier decisions, the Supreme Court struck down programs that it
believed gave direct aid to sectarian schools. 93 In Committee for Public
Education and Religious Liberty v. Nyquist,94 the Supreme Court struck down
direct aid to private schools for the maintenance and repair of buildings, 95
tuition reimbursement to low-income families,96 and tax deduction for tuition
expenses of private schools. 97 Though the Court struck down all three
provisions,98 the tuition reimbursement is most relevant here. The Nyquist
Court stated that there is a distinction between direct and indirect aid to
sectarian schools, but called the disbursement to parents only one factor to be
considered. 99 The Court concluded that the reimbursement to parents acted as
direct aid to schools when "the grants are offered as an incentive to parents to
send their children to sectarian schools."' 100 That conclusion does not foreclose
the finding that the Cleveland Scholarship and Tutoring Program is
92 See Simmons-Harris, 1997 WL 217583, at *4 (citations omitted).
93 In its recent decision in Agostini v. Felton, the Supreme Court stated that it has
departed from the rule that "all governmental aid that directly aids the educational function of
the religious schools is invalid." 117 S. Ct. 1997, 2011 (1997). The Court's new focus seems
to be on two things: first, whether the aid is made generally available without regard to the
sectarian-nonsectarian, or public-nonpublic nature of the school benefited; second, if aid that
ultimately flowed to the sectarian school did so because of the independent and private choices
of individuals. See id.
94 413 U.S. 756 (1973).
95 See id. at 762, 769.
96 See id. at 764, 769.
97 See id. at 765, 769.
98 The Court struck down the grants for maintenance and repair of schools because of its
inevitable effect of freeing money for the sectarian school to spend on religious activity. See
id. at 779-80. The Court's reasoning for rejecting the tax deduction provision is instructive.
First, the Court noted the "practical similarity" between the tax deduction and the tuition
reimbursement provision. Id. at 794. The Court then distinguished the tax deduction in
Nyquist from the allowable tax exemption in Walz v. Tax Commission. See id. at 792-94. The
Nyquist Court pointed to the universal historical approval of tax exemptions for church
property, not present with a tax deduction for sectarian school tuition, and to the fact that the
tax exemption for church property tends to reinforce the separation between church and state.
See id. at 792-93.
99 See id. at 781.
100 Id. at 786.
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constitutional, however, because "the Nyquist Court explicitly declined to apply
its decision to a 'case involving some form of public assistance (e.g.
scholarships) made available generally without regard to the sectarian-
nonsectarian, or public-nonpublic nature of the institution benefited."' 101
Meek v. Pittenger0 2 presented the Supreme Court with a more apparent
form of direct aid. Though the Court upheld the direct loan of books to students
for use in sectarian schools on the basis of Board of Education of Central
School District v. Allen,103 the Court rejected a provision to allow the direct
loan of instructional materials to schools. 1°4 The Court believed that the loan
resulted in aid to the sectarian institution as a whole. 105
As it had in Nyquist, the Supreme Court once again blurred the line
between direct and indirect aid in Wolman v. Walter.'06 In Wolman, the
Supreme Court found that the loan of educational materials to students to be
unconstitutional direct aid to schools. The Wolman program would have
resulted in financial savings to the schools, allowing them to use the saved
money to support their religious function. To call such aid to sectarian schools
indirect aid, the Wolman Court said, would be to "exalt form over
substance." 107 Finally, in School District v. Ball, the Supreme Court held that a
Michigan program financing public school teachers to teach secular subjects to
sectarian students in sectarian schools was unconstitutional direct aid.108 The
Court found that the program violated the Establishment Clause in three ways:
first, the inability to guarantee that teachers would not inculcate religious values
to their students; second, the risk of creating a symbolic link between the
government and the church; and third, the state funding for the program
allowed the sectarian schools more money to devote to their religious
functions. 10 9
101 Galton v. Goff, No. 96CVH-01-193, 1996 WL 466499, at *9 (Franklin County Ohio
C.P. July 31, 1996) (quoting Nyquist, 413 U.S. at 782 n.38), rev'd sub nom. Simmons-Harris
v. Goff, No. 96APE08-982, 1997 WL 217583 (10th Dist. Ohio Ct. App. May 1, 1997).
102 421 U.S. 349 (1975).
103 392 U.S. 236 (1968).
104 See Meek, 421 U.S. at 361-63. Instructional materials were defined to include
"periodicals, photographs, maps, charts, sound recordings" or other material of a similar
nature. Id. at 355.
105 See id. at 366.
106 433 U.S. 229 (1977).
107Id. at 250.
108 See School Dist. v. Ball, 473 U.S. 373, 381 (1985).
109 See Agostini v. Felton, 117 S. Ct. 1997, 2010 (1997) (explaining Ba!o.
1997]
OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL
b. Constitutional Indirect Aid to Schools
Cases since Wolman v. Walter have shaken up Establishment Clause
jurisprudence and paved the way for the Supreme Court to hold that school
vouchers like the ones offered in the Cleveland Scholarship and Tutoring
Program are constitutional. The first of these, Mueller v. Allen, upheld the
constitutionality of tax deductions for expenses incurred for the tuition,
transportation, and textbooks of children attending primary and secondary
schools. 110 The Mueller Court explained the significant distinguishing feature of
the Minnesota plan from the tax deduction struck down in Nyquist. The tax
deduction at issue in Nyquist was only available to those who sent their children
to private schools, whereas the deduction in Minnesota was available without
regard to whether the school was public, sectarian, or nonsectarian.' 1 The
Court stated that "a program... that neutrally provides state assistance to a
broad spectrum of citizens is not readily subject to challenge under the
Establishment Clause."11 2 Also important was that the tax deduction became
available only from the "numerous, private choices of individual parents of
school-age children."" 3
The second significant ruling from Mueller was that a statistical analysis
showing that students of sectarian schools disproportionately benefit from a
facially neutral statute is not sufficient to invalidate that statute." 4 In Mueller,
the plaintiffs contended that because most parents of public school children have
no tuition expense, and because transportation and textbook expenses are
minimal, the tax deduction served to benefit primarily religious institutions." 5
The Court rejected this argument. The Court was hesitant to overturn a facially
neutral statute on the basis of statistics from any one year for fear that such an
approach would lead to uncertainty in the law.116 Further, the plaintiffs'
reasoning did not take account of other special benefits of parochial schools
110 See Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S. 388, 390-91 (1983).
111 Seeid. at 398.
112 Id. at 398-99. The Court also stated that the broad spectrum of recipients "is an
important index of secular effect." Id. at 397 (citing Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 277
(1981) (holding that a state university that has a policy allowing student groups to use its
facilities cannot prevent religious student groups from using the facilities for religious
purposes)).
113 Mueller, 463 U.S. at 399.
114 See Gatton v. Goff, No. 96CVH-01-193, 1996 WL 466499, at *11 (Franklin County
Ohio C.P. July 31, 1996), rev'd sub nom. Simmons-Harris v. Goff, No. 96APE08-982, 1997
WL 217583 (10th Dist. Ohio Ct. App. May 1, 1997).
115 See Mueller, 463 U.S. at 401.
116 See id. Uncertainty in that a program that disproportionately benefits students from
sectarian schools one year may disproportionately benefit a different group the next year.
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noted by the Court: private schools provide an educational alternative to
millions of students; they provide a healthy competition for the public schools;
finally, they lessen the district's tax burden by eliminating the expense of
educating private school children in public schools.117
The second significant case, Witters v. Washington Department of Services
for the Blind,"8 involved a statute providing for vocational rehabilitative
services to the blind. Witters, who was blind, sought to take advantage of the
services during his religious training at the sectarian Inland Empire School of
the Bible.119 The Supreme Court, in a unanimous decision, held that providing
aid to Witters was not a violation of the Establishment Clause. 120 Like in
Mueller, the Court found that any money that flowed to a religious institution
was the result of "genuinely independent and private choices of aid
recipients." 12  Further, unlike the tuition reimbursement and tax deduction
plans struck down in Nyquist, the vocational assistance in Witters was made
available without regard to the nature of the institution benefited. 122 Finally,
unlike the Ayquist plan which gave incentive for parents to send their children
to private schools, 12 3 the Court found that the Witters program did "not tend to
provide greater or broader benefits for recipients who apply their aid to
religious education. "124
In Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills School District, the Supreme Court
followed the reasoning established in Witters and Mueller when they required
an Arizona school district to provide a sign language interpreter to a deaf
student attending a sectarian high school. 125 The Court held that the handicap
assistance program neutrally distributed benefits without regard to the religious
nature of the school, that the interpreter was only at the sectarian school as a
result of the private choice of the parents, and that the program did not provide
any financial incentive to choose a sectarian school. 126 Further, the Court
distinguished Zobrest from Meek and Ball stating that in those cases, but not in
Zobrest, the school was being relieved of a cost of educating its students that it
would have otherwise had to bear. 127
117 See id. at 401-02 (citation omitted).
118 474 U.S. 481 (1986).
119 See id. at 483.12 0 See id. at 489.
121 Id. at 488.
122 See id. at 488.
12 3 See supra note 99 and accompanying text.
124 Witters, 474 U.S. at 488.
125 See Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills Sch. Dist., 509 U.S. 1, 9-10 (1993).
126 See id. at 10 (citations omitted).
127 See id. at 13. The Court also distinguished between the role of a teacher who may
inculcate religious beliefs in students through their teaching and the role of an interpreter who
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Finally, in Agostini v. Felton, the Supreme Court repudiated its earlier logic
in Ball and in Aguilar v. Felton,128 by reversing its decision in the latter
case.129 In Agostini, the Court ruled that the Establishment Clause did not bar
public school teachers in New York City from teaching remedial education to
disadvantaged students in sectarian schools.130 The Court stated that Ball and
Aguilar rested on assumptions upon which the Supreme Court no longer relies
in its Establishment Clause jurisprudence. First, the Court stated that it has
abandoned the premise that the presence of public employees in sectarian
schools inevitably has the impermissable result of state-sponsored indoctrination
or creates a symbolic union between church and government.' 31 Secondly, the
Court reinforced the doctrine that aid is constitutional where the "aid is
allocated on the basis of neutral, secular criteria that neither favor nor disfavor
religion, and is made available to both religious and secular beneficiaries on a
nondiscriminatory basis." 132
C. Refuting the Appellate Court's Establishment Clause Argument
The Simmons-Harris appellate court's decision that the Scholarship
Program violated the Establishment Clause proceeded in two parts. First, it held
that the Program, considered as a whole, was not facially neutral. 133 Second, it
held that the Program gave direct and substantial aid to sectarian schools. As
such, the Program had the constitutionally impermissable effect of advancing
religion. 134 This section refutes those two arguments in turn and demonstrates
that the Scholarship Program does not have the primary purpose of advancing
religion.
Contrary to the plaintiffs' argument and the appellate court's decision that
the Scholarship Program is not neutral, 135 careful scrutiny of Mueller v.
Allen 136 reveals that the Scholarship Program neutrally provided benefits to
families of sectarian, nonsectarian, private, and public school children. The
Cleveland Scholarship and Tutoring Program fell within the explicit reservation
set aside in Nyquist for scholarships made available without regard to the
is merely supposed to transmit everything in the way it was originally intended. See id.
128 473 U.S. 402 (1985).
129 See Agostini v. Felton, 117 S. Ct. 1997 (1997).
130 See id. at 2016.
131 See id. at 2010.
132 1d. at 2014.
133 See Simmons-Harris v. Goff, No. 96APE08-982, 1997 WL 217583, at *9 (10th
Dist. Ohio Ct. App. May 1, 1997).
134 See id.
135 See id. at *7.
136 463 U.S. 388 (1983).
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sectarian or nonsectarian nature of the school benefited. 137 The statute was
designed to provide scholarships to private school students in Cleveland, public
school students in adjoining districts, or tutorial assistance grants to public
school students in Cleveland. 138 The Ohio appellate court decided that the
Scholarship Program is not neutral for two reasons: first, no eligible public
school districts outside of Cleveland chose to join the Program in its pilot year;
second, the scholarship amount awarded to families of private school children is
greater than the amount of tutorial assistance given to children attending
Cleveland public schools. 139 The appellate court insisted on comparing the
relative values of the scholarship and tutoring grants both qualitatively and
quantitatively to determine if the Program is facially neutral. 140
This construction twists the logic of Mueller. While it is true that public
school districts surrounding Cleveland did not join the Program in its pilot year,
the Ohio appellate court completely failed to acknowledge and give weight to
the fact that scholarships were awarded to students attending both sectarian and
nonsectarian private schools. 141 Also, voucher programs are intended to
137 See Gatton v. Goff, No. 96CVH-01-193, 1996 WL 466499, at *13 (Franklin County
Ohio C.P. July 31, 1996) (citing Committee for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist,
413 U.S. 756, 782 n.38 (1973)), rev'd sub nom. Simmons-Harris v. Goff, No. 96APE08-
982, 1997 WL 217583 (10th Dist. Ohio Ct. App. May 1, 1997). The Supreme Court stated in
Nyquist that it "need not decide whether the significantly religious character of the statute's
beneficiaries might differentiate the present cases from a case involving some form of public
assistance (e.g., scholarships) made available generally without regard to the sectarian-
nonsectarian, or public-nonpublic nature of the institution benefited." Nyqtdst, 413 U.S. at
782 n.38. This logic was reinforced most recently in Agostini. See Agostini, 117 S. Ct. at
2014 (citation omitted). Constitutional scholar Laurence Tribe has written that "[tihe
establishment clause probably would not stand as an obstacle to a purely neutral program, at
least one with a broad enough class of beneficiary schools and one that channeled aid through
parents and children rather than directly to schools." LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN
CoNSTm oNAL LAw § 1410 at 1223 (2d ed. 1988) (citation omitted); see also Jonathan B.
Cleveland, School Choice: American Elementary and Secondary Education Enter the "Adapt
or Die" Environment of a Competitive Marketplace, 29 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 75, 139 (1995)
(citation omitted) (stating that a properly crafted voucher plan can include religious schools
and be constitutional).
138 See onlo REv. CODE ANN. § 3313.975(A) (Banks-Baldwin 1996). Plaintiffs object
that this is not an accurate description of the Program because the dollar value of the tutorial
assistance grants is limited to 20% of the value of the scholarships. See Motion of Plaintiffs
Doris Simmons-Harris, et al., For Summary Judgment at 8, Gatton v. Goff, No. 96CVH-01-
193, 1996 WL 466499 (Franklin County Ohio C.P. July 31, 1996) (citing Oaio REv. CODE
ANN. § 3313.978(C)).139 See Simmons-Harris, 1997 WL 217583, at *7-9.
140 See id. at *9.
14 1 In its summary of the factual setting, the appellate court stated that approximately
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encourage the creation of new schools, and it is possible that the proportion of
sectarian to nonsectarian school participation will shift dramatically in future
years.' 42 It is also true that individual scholarship values can be up to five times
greater the amount of tutorial assistance. 143 However, that the appellate court is
looking for a sort of mathematical equality here is ironic when Mueller itself
found facially neutral a tax deduction that would not provide any significant
benefit to families of public school children. 144 The Cleveland Scholarship and
Tutoring Program did provide benefits to public school children. Public school
students had the benefit of the tutorial assistance grants in the pilot year.
Further, had public school districts surrounding Cleveland opted to join the
Program, students at those public schools would have benefited as well.
After deciding that the Scholarship Program is not facially neutral, the
Simmons-Harris appellate court made a second mistake in determining that the
aid to sectarian schools was direct and substantial. To determine whether the
aid to the school is direct or indirect, the court correctly identified the issue to
be whether the aid flowed to sectarian institutions only as the result of
"'genuinely independent and private choices of aid recipients.'"'145 The
appellate court dismissed as "meaningless" the choice of parents who elected to
enroll their children in either private sectarian or nonsectarian schools because
of the lack of public school participation and the high percentage of
80% of the participating schools were sectarian and approximately 20% were nonsectarian.
See id. at *2.
The appellate court also implied that under a recent school funding decision, see
DeRolph v. Ohio, 677 N.E.2d 733 (Ohio 1997), the General Assembly had the responsibility
and the power to compel the school districts surrounding Cleveland to join in the Program.
See Simmons-Harris, 1997 WL 217583, at *8. I posit that the General Assembly would not
have accepted that it had such power before DeRolph was decided; further, by striking down
the Program the General Assembly is being denied the opportunity to compel such expansion
if it is warranted.
142 See Affidavit of Mary Ann Jackson, Gatton v. Goff, No. 96CVH-01-193, 1996 WL
466499 (Franklin County Ohio C.P. July 31, 1996) (stating that the goals of the educational
organization, HOPE, include encouraging participation in the Scholarship Program and
assisting in the creation of new schools); Memorandum of Amici Curiae In Support of
Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment at 4, Gatton v. Goff, No. 96CVH-01-193, 1996
WL 466499 (Franklin County Ohio C.P. July 31, 1996) (stating that there is a likelihood that
new nonreligious private schools will come into existence as a result of the Scholarship
Program because the private schools will be able to better compete with public schools);
Innerst, supra note 89, at A6 (stating that twelve private schools had planned to open in
Cleveland with the start of the voucher program).
143 See Omo REv. CODE ANN. § 3313.978(C)(3) (Banks-Baldwin Supp. 1996).
144 See supra notes 114-17 and accompanying text.
145 Simmons-Harris, 1997 WL 217583, at *9 (quoting Witters v. Washington Dep't of
Servs. for the Blind, 474 U.S. 481,487 (1986)).
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participating sectarian schools. 146 The court revealed its error when it stated
that the "real choice available to most parents is between sending their child to
a sectarian school and having their child remain in the troubled Cleveland City
School District." 147 Once again the court ignored the important fact that twenty
percent of the participating schools are nonsectarian. 148 And it ignored the
important fact that despite the impressive support of the Scholarship Program
from some parents, the vast majority of families chose not to even apply for the
scholarships.
Parents who chose to participate in the Scholarship Program made the
genuine and independent choice to do so. It is only as a result of their choices
that the sectarian and nonsectarian private schools receive indirect benefit. The
students' applications for scholarships from the state and their applications to be
enrolled in participating private schools were independent of one another. The
students applied to the Superintendent of Schools for the scholarships. The
Superintendent determined if students qualified for the Program, allocated the
scholarships (giving preference to students from low-income families), and then
determined the amount of scholarship for which the students were eligible. The
application to enroll in the participating school was done by parents alone,
independent of the state. The state and sectarian schools only interacted when
the schools notified the Superintendent that they had enrolled a scholarship
winner.149 In no way did this limited interaction negate from the fact that the
schools only indirectly received state aid as a result of the genuinely
independent choice of parents.
This conclusion is strengthened by the Supreme Court's decision in
Rosenberger v. Rector.150 The Court held in Rosenberger that the
Establishment Clause did not prohibit the University of Virginia from funding a
religious campus organization newsletter in the same way it funded newsletters
for other campus organizations. The Court wrote that "the guarantee of
neutrality is respected, not offended, when the government, following neutral
criteria and evenhanded policies, extends benefits to recipients whose ideologies
and viewpoints, including religious ones, are broad and diverse." 151 The dissent
conceded that the issue was not the payment, or form of payment, but "whether
there is 'a third party standing between the government and the ultimate
146 Id. at *10.
147 Id.
148 See supra note 141.
149 See Gatton v. Goff, No. 96CVH-01-193, 1996 WL 466499, at *14 (Franlin County
Ohio C.P. July 31, 1996), rev'd sub nom. Simmons-Harris v. Goff, No. 96APE08-982, 1997
WL 217583 (10th Dist. Ohio Ct. App. May 1, 1997).
150 115 S. Ct. 2510 (1995).
151 Id. at 2521.
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religious beneficiary to break the circuit by its independent decision to put state
money to religious use.' 152 In the Cleveland Scholarship and Tutoring
Program the parents are the third party that breaks the circuit.
Finally, the Simmons-Harris appellate court placed too much emphasis on
"substantial" aid flowing to sectarian schools. 153 The court distinguished
Mueller v. Allen, 154 Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills School District,155 and Witters
v. Washington Department of Services for the Blind'56 on the basis that a
smaller portion of the total aid in those programs flowed to sectarian schools,
thus making the aid incidental. 157 This conclusion overlooks other key features
of those Supreme Court decisions. In Mueller, where only parents whose
children attended private schools could truly benefit from the tax deduction, it
was estimated that over ninety percent of the aid went to children in private
schools. 158 Additionally, in Agostini the Court stated that it was not "willing to
conclude that the constitutionality of an aid program depends on the number of
sectarian school students who happen to receive the otherwise neutral aid." 159
Further, in both Witters and Zobrest the Supreme Court made clear that it
was concerned with whether the money expended created financial incentive
for the students to attend sectarian schools, 160 not with the total expenditure.
The Cleveland Scholarship and Tutoring Program did not differentiate between
students attending sectarian and nonsectarian schools in awarding its
scholarships. It also gave financial aid to students attending public schools
through its tutorial assistance grants. Finally, despite the scholarship aid, it
remains quite possible that the cost of attending the sectarian school will still be
152 State's Reply Brief in Support of its Motion for Summary Judgment at 12, Gatton v.
Goff, No. 96CVH-01-193, 1996 WL 466499 (Franklin County Ohio C.P. July 31, 1996)
(quoting Rosenberger, 115 S. Ct. at 2545 (Souter, J., dissenting)).
The plaintiffs try to use Rosenberger to argue against school vouchers saying that the
Court distinguished funding a campus publication from "'a tax levied for the direct support of
a church or group of churches'" where Establishment Clause dangers were inherent. Motion
of Plaintiffs Sue Gatton, et al., for Summary Judgment at 46, Gatton v. Goff, No. 96CVH-
01-193, 1996 WL 466499 (Franklin County Ohio C.P. July 31, 1996) (quoting Rosenberger,
115 S. Ct. at 2522-23). This reasoning is not dispositive here because only students benefit
directly from vouchers and any benefit to religious schools is the indirect result of the
independent choice of parents.
153 See Simmons-Harris, 1997 WL 217583, at *10.
154 463 U.S. 388 (1983).
155 509 U.S. 1 (1993).
156 474 U.S. 481 (1986).
157 See Simmons-Harris, 1997 WL 217583, at *10.
158 See Mueller, 463 U.S. at 401.
159 Agostini v. Felton, 117 S. Ct. 1997, 2013 (1997).
160 See Zobrest, 509 U.S. at 9-10 (citing Witters, 474 U.S. at 488).
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greater than attending a public school when incidental costs such as uniforms
and transportation are factored in. Such factors belie any argument that the
Scholarship Program gives incentive to choose sectarian schools.
D. Additional Arguments Supporting the Constitutionality of the
Cleveland Scholarship and Tutoring Program
Additional arguments can be made defending the constitutionality of the
Scholarship Program using traditional Lemon test analysis and alternative
Establishment Clause tests.
1. Following in the Footsteps of Zobrest and Mueller
Two arguments supporting the constitutionality of the Program come from
the Supreme Court's reasoning in Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills School
District.161 In Zobrest, the Court distinguished its decision mandating that the
school district provide an interpreter for a deaf student attending a sectarian
high school, from its decisions in Meek v. Pittenger62 and School District v.
Ball.163 In Meek, the sectarian school was relieved of the cost of purchasing
educational materials and in Ball, from the cost of teacher salaries and
education materials. 164 The Cleveland Scholarship and Tutoring Program does
not relieve participating schools of any costs. The schools will receive, at most,
the regular amount of tuition from both scholarship and non-scholarship
students. Further, because participating schools cannot charge scholarship
students more than ten percent of the amount of the scholarship in additional
tuition, 165 schools charging higher tuition may end up bearing additional cost in
educating scholarship students.
The second argument in Zobrest that supports the constitutionality of school
vouchers comes from Justice Blackmun's dissent. Blackmun sought to
distinguish the aid provided to sectarian schools that was upheld in Witters v.
Washington Department of Services for the Blind 66 and Mueller v. Allen167
from the providing of the sign language interpreter in Zobrest. Blackmun said
that Witters and Mueller involved the payment of cash or a tax deduction
"where the governmental involvement ended with the disbursement of funds or
161 509 U.S. 1 (1993).
162 421 U.S. 349 (1975).
163 473 U.S. 373 (1985).
164 See Zobrest, 509 U.S. at 12.
165 See Omo REv. CODE ANN. § 3313.976(A)(8) (Banks-Baldwin 1996).
166 474 U.S. 481 (1986).
167 463 U.S. 388 (1983).
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lessening of tax." 168 Blackmun contrasted that one-time payment with the
"ongoing, daily, and intimate governmental participation in the teaching and
propagation of religious doctrine" 169 involved in providing a sign-language
interpreter. Under Blackmun's analysis, the Cleveland Scholarship and
Tutoring Program is clearly more analogous to Mueller and Witters.
Involvement between the state and the sectarian schools is limited. First, the
sectarian school notifies the state of the recipient students it will enroll. Second,
the state sends checks payable to parents of scholarship students to the school.
There is not ongoing governmental participation in the teaching of religion, or
any other subject, through the issuing of scholarship checks.
A social justice argument springing from the Mueller decision also argues
in favor of school vouchers for low-income families. Mueller allowed a tax
deduction to parents for the expense of sending children to private schools. 170
Like the benefits of the Cleveland Scholarship and Tutoring Program, the
deduction in Mueller was available regardless of the sectarian nature of the
school attended. Vouchers and tax deductions can both have the same result of
eliminating the financial cost of sending children to private schools. However,
tax deductions benefit only the wealthy whose itemized deductions exceed the
standard deduction. Vouchers benefit low-income families that could never
qualify for the tax deduction. 171
2. Alternative Establishment Clause Tests
Because the Lemon test has been the subject of intense criticism, it is
important to examine the constitutionality of the Cleveland Scholarship and
Tutoring Program under other advocated Establishment Clause tests.172 Justice
O'Connor defined a new test for the Establishment Clause in her concurring
opinion in Lynch v. Donnelly,173 a case concerning a creche erected by the City
of Pawtucket. Her endorsement test changed the focus of the purpose and
effects prongs of the Lemon test.174 The correct focus of the purpose prong, she
wrote, "is whether the government intends to convey a message of endorsement
168 Zobrest, 509 U.S. at 22 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
169 Id.
170 See Mueller, 463 U.S. at 391.
171 See Cleveland, supra note 137, at 138 (footnotes omitted).
172 See Stick, supra note 72, at 453 (stating that it is important to examine other tests
because Lemon has been critiqued and its future is uncertain); Weishaar, supra note 91, at
561 (calling for analysis under other tests because of the possibility for modification of
Lemon); supra notes 71-78 and accompanying text.
173 465 U.S. 668 (1984) (O'Connor, J., concurring).
174 O'Connor stated that "[flocusing on... endorsement or disappoval of religion
clarifies the Lemon test as an analytical device." Id. at 689 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
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or approval of religion."' 75 The correct focus of the effects prong, she
believed, should be "whether, irrespective of government's actual purpose, the
practice under review in fact conveys a message of endorsement or
disapproval."' 76 This endorsement test covers more government activity than
just direct efforts at funding religious indoctrination programs: "[glovemment
promotes religion as effectively when it fosters a close identification of its
powers and responsibilities with those of any-or all-religious denominations
as when it attempts to inculcate specific religious doctrines." 177 Such
governmental endorsement creates a "symbolic union" between church and
state. 178 Commentators have suggested using this endorsement test for vouchers
because they deal with impressionable young children who are most likely to be
affected by this symbolic union. 179
School voucher programs, like those in the Cleveland Scholarship and
Tutoring Program, are constitutional under O'Connor's endorsement test.
180
Ohio is not endorsing religion through its implementation of the Program. The
Program was designed to benefit students regardless of the nature of the school
they attend by offering scholarships to be used at participating sectarian private
schools, nonsectarian private schools, and public schools outside of Cleveland,
as well as tutorial assistance grants for public school students in the Cleveland
District.181 In this way the state is not endorsing religion, but rather remaining
neutral towards religion.' 82 O'Connor has stated that "[wjhat is crucial is that a
government practice not have the effect of communicating a message of
government endorsement or disapproval of religion."'183 A plan that allowed the
participation of all schools except those with a sectarian nature would show
state disapproval of religion.
175 Id. at 691 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
176 Id. at 690 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
177 School Dist. v. Ball, 473 U.S. 373, 389 (1985).
178 Id. at 390.
179 See id. (stating that children are most likely to be influenced by the symbolic union
because their experience is limited and their beliefs are more easily affected by their
environment); Weishaar, supra note 91 (stating that Establishment Clause cases involving
young children need a higher level of scrutiny because of the impressionable mture of young
children).
180 See Cleveland, supra note 136, at 138. But see Weishaar, supra note 90, at 543
(stating that voucher proposals would have a greater difficulty passing O'Connor's
endorsement test than the traditional Lemon test).
181 See supra note 24 and accompanying text.
182 But see Weishaar, supra note 91, at 571 (stating that because sectarian schools may
be perceived as the better schools, students will have little choice but to attend them and,
therefore, government is endorsing religion).
183 Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 692 (1984) (O'Connor, J., concurring).
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Further, in determining if the Program has the effect of promoting religion,
"[t]he relevant issue is whether an objective observer, acquainted with the text,
legislative history, and implementation of the statute, would perceive it as a
state endorsement" of sectarian schools. 184 As has been stated earlier, the
purpose of the Cleveland Scholarship and Tutoring Program is to provide real
educational choices to students regardless of the financial situation of their
parents. Any message that is communicated regarding religion is incidental. 18 5
The message is incidental because in this Program, the choice to send students
to sectarian schools using state-provided scholarships is made by the parents. It
is the parents who are voicing their endorsement of the sectarian schools, not
the state. 186 The state makes the funds available, but the parents make the
choice of schools. Parents make the choice to expose their children to religious
schooling.
Cases that have failed the endorsement test have involved the use of public
space to convey a religious message. For example, in School District v. Ball,
the Supreme Court concluded that a program where public school teachers
went into sectarian classrooms to teach secular subjects conveyed a powerful
message of endorsement when those classrooms were used for religious
instruction at other times during the day. 187 This conclusion was specifically
abandoned in Agostini v. Felton when the Supreme Court rejected the
presumption that "the placement of public employees on parochial school
grounds inevitably results in the impermissable effect of state-sponsored
indoctrination or constitutes a symbolic union between government and
religion."' 188 The Cleveland Scholarship and Tutoring Program does not
involve the use of public facilities or a public forum to convey a religious
message. Scholarship students are not exposed to religious beliefs without
184 Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 76 (1985) (O'Connor, J., concurring). At least one
commentator has critiqued O'Connor's modification of her test stating that the fictitious
objective observer tends to fold the effects prong into the purpose prong. See Steven D.
Smith, Symbols, Perceptions, and Doctrinal Illusions: Establishment Neutrality and the "No
Endorsement" Test, 86 MicH. L. REv. 266, 286-91 (1987). This occurs because "[ain
objective observer who knows what the legislature intended will only perceive endorsement
when she concludes that there was actual intent to endorse." Stick, supra note 72, at 458.
185 See Stick, supra note 72, at 457.
186 See All Things Considered, supra note 41; McLarin, supra note 16, at B9 (stating
that one family sends their children to a sectarian school because they like the values, rules,
discipline, and attention that their child receives).
187 See School Dist. v. Ball, 473 U.S. 373, 392 (1985); see also Lee v. Weisman, 505
U.S. 577, 609 (1992) (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (declaring that an invocation or benediction
in the form of prayer at public school graduation was an impermissible endorsement of
religion).
188 Agostini v. Felton, 117 S. Ct. 1997, 2010 (1997).
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parents making the voluntary choice of sending their child to a sectarian
school. 189 Just as O'Connor stated in terms of applying vocational assistance to
a Bible college, "The aid to religion at issue here is the result of petitioner's
private choice. No reasonable observer is likely to draw from the facts before
us an inference that the State itself is endorsing a religious practice or
belief."19
After concluding that the Cleveland Scholarship and Tutoring Program
does not violate Justice O'Connor's endorsement test, it is easy to conclude that
the Program does not violate the coercion test proposed by Justice Kennedy in
Lee v. Weisman.191 Writing for the Court, Justice Kennedy held in Weisman
that a Providence, Rhode Island program allowing clergy to offer nonsectarian
benedictions at public middle schools and high schools violated the
Establishment Clause. 192 The case is significant for spelling out Kennedy's
concern "with protecting freedom of conscience from subtle coercive pressure
in the elementary and secondary public schools. ' 193 He feared that even
nonsectarian benedictions offered "in a school context may appear to the
nonbeliever or dissenter to be an attempt to employ the machinery of the State
to enforce a religious orthodoxy." 194 Such fear would be misplaced in the
context of a voucher program. When parents choose a sectarian school for their
child to attend, the machinery of the state is not being used to inculcate religion.
Parents choose how much, if any, religious exposure their children will
encounter in school.
V. CONCLUSION
The appellate court decision in Simmons-Harris v. Goff will not be the final
189 Cf Cleveland, supra note 137, at 138 (stating that although indoctrination may
generally apply where religious symbols are thrust on students in public schools, the
indoctrinal causal chain is broken when parents make the choice to send their children to
sectarian schools).
190 Witters v. Washington Dep't of Servs. for the Blind, 474 U.S. 481, 493 (1986)
(O'Connor, J., concurring). The reasonableness of the observer is a factor to be considered.
O'Connor's endorsement test is based on perception, but to be a valid test that perception
should be based on valid assumptions for "mistaken public perceptions about whether
something is religious... should not determine the outcome of cases." Kent Greenawalt,
Religion as a Concept in Constitutional Law, 72 CAL. L. REv. 753, 795 n.166 (1984).
191 505 U.S. 577 (1992).
192 See id. at 580-81.
193 Id. at 592 (citations omitted).
194 Id. In fact, the coercion test advocated by Justice Kennedy appears to be better suited
to cases of religious coercion in public schools than to situations where parents voluntarily
send their children to sectarian schools with public funds.
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word on the constitutionality of school vouchers or even of the Cleveland
Scholarship and Tutoring Program. The Supreme Court of Ohio has accepted
the writ of certiorari to the State's appeal. The state's highest court undoubtedly
will be influenced by the U.S. Supreme Court decision, Agostini v. Felton,195
which came down after the appellate decision. The Agostini decision and its
non-alarmist position on the presence of government in sectarian schools signals
that the Court is ready to recognize the constitutionality of voucher programs.
Where the government merely provides low-income families with the
opportunity to choose to send their children to sectarian schools the same
opportunity middle- and upper-class families already enjoy the government is
not establishing, favoring, or endorsing religion.
195 117 S. Ct. 1997 (1997).
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